In a model with imperfect competition and multiple equilibria we show how an increase in the minimum wage can lead firms to reduce wages (and employment). We find some empirical support for this in the Card-Krueger minimum wage data.
Introduction
In a competitive labour market, a minimum wage increase raises wages to the new minimum wage level if they were initially below that level, with no change otherwise; the effect on employment can only be a reduction. Although monopsony can reverse the employment effect (e.g. Manning, 2003) , the wage predictions are unchanged. Recently, Bhaskar and To (2003) have shown how oligopsony may also change the wage prediction, with firms who originally set wages above the new minimum wage further increasing their wage. We expand on these possibilities by showing that in a model of oligopsony where the firms are also oligopolists, minimum wage increases can induce a reduction of wages (along with a reduction of employment). We present some evidence of this phenomenon in the Card and Krueger (1995) data on the New Jersey fast-food sector.
The model
We combine features of Dixon (1992) and Kaas and Madden (2004) in a 2-stage game, with wages and employment determined at stage I and prices and output at stage II. There are two firms, duopsonists in the labour market at stage I and duopolists in the stage II output market.
1 The production function of firm i is y i = l i where y i is output and l i is labour employed. At wage w the upward sloping labour supply is S(w), and the downward sloping inverse output demand is p = P( Y) where p is output price and Y aggregate quantity. The revenue function R( Y) = P( Y)Y is increasing (so demand is elastic) and concave. The unique Walrasian equilibrium wage w WE is defined by w(=p) = P(S(w)). Strategic interaction between firms under laissez-faire is as follows.
Stage I
Firms choose wages w i z 0 and labour demands J i . If w 1 = w 2 = w we assume that initially half of the supply S(w) offer to work at each firm, any unsuccessful offers being diverted to the other firm, implying for i = 1, 2 and j p i;
If w 1 N w 2 then workers S(w 1 ) offer themselves to firm 1 and those with the lowest reservation wage are hired first, 3 leaving a residual of max[S(w 2 ) min( J 1 , S(w 1 )), 0] for firm 2, giving
Stage II
Firms choose prices p 1 , p 2 for the sale of up to the output levels y i = l i . Since demand is elastic, this stage II (bBertrand-EdgeworthQ) subgame always has a unique Nash equilibrium, with market-clearing prices p 1 = p 2 = P(l 1 + l 2 ) -see Madden (1998) .
Thus subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game reduce to the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous move game where firm i chooses (w i , J i ) and, with l i defined by Eqs. (1) and (2), payoffs are:
w 1 = w 2 = w WE with J 1 , J 2 z S(w WE ) and p 1 = p 2 = 0 is an equilibrium of this game; if firm 1 undercuts the Walrasian wage, firm 2 takes the whole market (because of J 2 z S(w WE ) and Eq. (2)), leaving firm 1 with zero profits, and if firm 1 raises the wage, aggregate output can only increase (again because of J 2 z S(w WE ) and Eq. (2)) and its price falls, ensuring a loss for firm 1. The Appendix shows that this equilibrium isunique; Theorem 1. Under laissez-faire the unique equilibrium wage, employment and profit levels are Walrasian
The excess demands for labour ( J i N l i ) neutralise the output market power of firms. For instance a deviation from equilibrium in only J 1 has no effect on aggregate output (even if J 1 = 0 this remains at S(w WE )) and so has no effect on output price (which is always P(S(w WE )) ). With a legally binding minimum wage w MIN N 0, the game is the same except for the stage I restriction to w i z w
MIN
. If w MIN = w WE the equilibrium of Theorem 1 remains, but there is another equilibrium. Suppose w 1 = w 2 = w MIN and firms set labour demands which produce unemployment (
, which is concave in J i. Maximizing with respect to J i produces candidate new equilibrium labour demands J 1 = J 2 = J where Y = 2J and,
The marginal revenue curve w( Y) slopes down as in Fig. 1 . In fact Y is the Cournot-Nash aggregate output level when firms face constant marginal costs w = w 1 . The candidate generates the assumed unemployment whenever w N w shown in Fig. 1, and 
WE the unique equilibrium is the minimum wage, positive profits, unemployment equilibrium of (b) above.
One can argue for the positive profits at the new equilibrium as a selection mechanism -the new minimum wage equilibrium Pareto dominates the original. The announcement of the new minimum wage may also make the new equilibrium focal. Thus a minimum wage increase may lead to lower wages and employment at firms that were originally paying wages above the minimum wage.
Empirical evidence
We analysed Card and Krueger's (1995) bnatural experimentQ data on fast food restaurants in Pennsylvania and New Jersey in 1992. In April 1992 the New Jersey minimum wage rose from $4.25 to $5.05 while the minimum wage in Pennsylvania remained at $4.25. Card and Krueger examined the employment impact of the wage hike, however they also collected data on the starting wage for restaurant employees. Table 1 shows that a relatively small proportion of New Jersey restaurants offered starting wages above the new minimum of $5.05 before the hike. Of the 23 firms in New Jersey that were paying in excess of $5.05, 18 reduced their starting wage to the new minimum when it came into effect. This is prima facie evidence in favour of the theoretical result. Further analysis of the firms that reduced starting wages to $5.05 suggests that this was not a trivial reduction in the majority of cases. The mean reduction was 27 cents while the modal reduction was 45 cents.
There is evidence that firms that lowered wages also reduced employment. Table 2 shows the change in full-time equivalent employment for all restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania as well as for those 18 restaurants in New Jersey that reduced their wage to the new minimum. The second row, where we consider only the wage reducers in New Jersey, shows a substantial and statistically significant reduction of around five employees (two-tailed p-value = 0.028). , w 1 ), p 1 (ŵ 1 ). Finally, w 1 N w MIN and J 1 z S(w 1 ) implies p 1 = p 1 (w 1 ). Thus the best that firm 1 can achieve with w 1 N w MIN is p (w 1 ). Hence the candidate is an equilibrium iff p(w MIN ) z p(w 1 ) for all w z w MIN . Now p (w) = 2 p(w) N 0, so p (w) N p(w); also p(w WE ) = 0 b p(w 
